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A Return to Ba‘thist Economics? Escaping Vicious Circles in Iraq 
“... the lack of law and order is bound to delay the country’s economic rebirth. 
Yet without that rebirth, the country will remain sullen, resentful and a breeding 
ground for all sorts of undesirable developments. It is a vicious circle.”1
“Everyone is aware of the risk of terrorism. But there are risks inside Iraq that are 
within our control and we’re not managing them well. I would like to flag the de-
Ba‘thification process.”2
Samir Shakir Mahumoud, Iraqi Interior Minister 
“We want to go back to the old healthy management of the 1970s”.3
Thamir Ghadhban – Oil Minister, Iraqi Interim Government 
Introduction 
In the midst of the daily reports of suicide bombings, insurgents, coalition causalities, 
the relentless toll of civilian dead and wounded and general all-around grief, any ap-
praisal of Iraq’s economy has seemed irrelevant when set against the greater military 
and security concerns.4 Yet the long run health of the economy will be crucial in de-
termining if Iraq will be able to transition to a stable democracy.5
Many authorities on post-conflict reconstruction feel that the June 30, 2004 In-
terim Government’s most significant challenge is one of delivering measurable im-
provements to the Iraqi people. Typical comments to this effect usually run along the 
following lines:  
“I think the new government will gain legitimacy in the eyes of the people on one 
condition: if it delivers on security, infrastructure, and employment.”  
“If [Cabinet members] manage to deliver, even on the latter two, it will make a 
major difference. If not, the whole thing will fall apart.”6  
Significantly a large proportion of the Interim Iraqi Government’s Prime Minister 
Iyad Allawi’s initial national address was focused on the economic issues confronting 
Iraq. Allawi, a Ba‘thist who served in the Iraqi intelligence services until falling out 
with the regime and leaving Iraq in 1971, cited inflation, unemployment and weak 
purchasing power as the main economic problems facing the country. He indicated 
that the government planned to stabilize the exchange rate for the dinar, improve liv-
ing conditions and boost oil output. While he offered7 no specific prescription towards 
solving these problems, he did at least acknowledge that a year after the fall of Baghdad, 
the country’s economy is at a watershed.  
                                                          
1  “Vicious Circle”, Al-Jazeerah.info July 5, 2003. 
2  Quoted in Paul Richter, “Official Rethink Ban on Baathists”, Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2004, p. A1. 
3  Quoted in “Iraq to Shed US Oil Advisers”, BBC News June 10, 2004. 
4  Bill Jamison, “Dawn of Hope for Iraqi Economy”, Scotland on Sunday, May 30, 2004. 
5  Robert Barro, “A Democratic Iraq Isn’t an Impossible Dream”, Business Week, March 31, 2003. 
6  Quotations from “Iraq: Who’s in Charge”, Council on Foreign Relations, June 2, 2004. 
7  Hamza Hendawi, “Iraq Prime Minister Makes First National Address”, Sacramento Bee, June 4, 2004. 
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Clearly many factors have interacted to produce the country’s current economic 
crisis. The sections below attempt to identify these factors and in doing so hopefully 
shed some light on how Iraq’s economy is likely to fare under the post June 30th 2004 
transition government and its eventual elected successor. What will be needed to sta-
bilize the economy and prepare it for recovery? Are these policies likely to be under-
taken through the neo-liberal free market framework put in place by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), or a more home-grown neo-Ba‘thist statist type pro-
gram? The possible implications of for the Iraqi economy’s eventual recovery of a 
return to Ba‘thist economics?  
1 The Ba‘thist Economic Model 
What type of economy did post-War Iraq inherit? Many observers8 liken Iraq’s pre-
sent economic situation to that of the Eastern European Transition economies of the 
early 1990s. There are, however, significant differences however between those pre-
viously socialist economies and the one created by the Ba‘thists.  
While, the formal name of the party that ruled Iraq from 1968 to 2003 was the 
“Arab Socialist Ba‘th Party”, the party’s economic orientation was far more Arab than 
Socialist. Alnasrawi9 places Ba‘th socialism in the main stream of Arab socialism 
which, as a political ideology, comprises a complex mélange of Islamic egalitarian-
ism, Eastern political tradition, modern social democracy, latter-day anti-colonialism, 
and a dash of socialist orthodoxy. The main ideological underpinnings of the Ba‘th 
party were Arab unity and independence from foreign domination, not class struggle. 
In principle, the Islamic roots of Arab socialism are embedded in a basic national 
commitment to equality of opportunity. Its Eastern centralist character is rooted in a 
powerful, paternalistic, and avowedly benevolent government which serves as both 
the apex of nationhood and the arbiter of individual rights. A distinct preference for 
modern social democracy may be found in the public guarantees of economic security 
and related welfare measures for all citizens. Anti-colonialism underlies hostility to-
wards tied foreign aid and loans, suspicion of multinational private investments, and 
an inclination toward intense nationalism. Socialist orthodoxy is partly reflected in the 
advocacy of nationalization for the economy’s key industries, denunciation of mo-
nopoly capitalism, and a search for freedom from all forms of exploitation.10
The Ba‘thists followed a “top-down” approach to development financing the 
creation of large state owned industrial firms with oil revenues. Their hope was to di-
versify the economy and kick-start economic growth. Many of the state enterprises 
they created as a means to this end still operate today, albeit as models of ineffi-
ciency.11 Interestingly, it appears that in actual practice Ba‘thist development policies 
were virtually identical to those of all Iraqi governments that ruled after the overthrow 
                                                          
8  For example, Robert Lane Green, “Socialist Realism”, The New Republic, October 21, 2003. 
9  Abbas Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq: Oil, Wars, Destruction of Development and Prospects, 1500–2010 
(Westport Connecticut, 1994), p. 61. 
10  Jahangir Amuzegar, “Ideology and Economic Growth in the Middle East”, The Middle East Journal, 
Winter 1974, p. 2. 
11  WilliamBlock, Christoher Foote, and Simon Gray, The Current Economic Situation in Iraq, Draft, 
November 10, 2003, p. 6. 
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of the British-installed monarchy in 1958.12 Nationalism and economic realism13 are 
the constants in Iraqi economic policymaking in the post-1958 period. 
In implementing its socialist development plans, Iraq adopted a full employment 
policy in 1968.14 Under this program the public sector was obliged to provide a job for 
each individual regardless of market forces. The result was over-employment in the 
public sector and manpower shortages, especially skilled workers, in the private sec-
tor. Still, the Ba‘thist Economic Model appeared to revitalize the economy. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) grew dramatically in the 1970s and early 1980s. This ex-
pansion contributed to the Ba‘thist economic mystique. In less decade, Iraq had be-
come the leading Arab economy of the time. Under the surface, however many prob-
lems were developing.  
As might be expected, the Ba‘thist program created severe economic imbalances, 
resulting in inflationary pressures and lower productivity. Many of the economy’s 
fundamental weaknesses were covered-up by the surge in oil revenues during most of 
the 1970s and into the 1980s. However, with the war with Iran (1980-88) and its high 
demands on manpower and resources, economic growth began to slow down. The war 
together with oil price crash in 1986 brought the economy to a near halt.  
In 1987, Iraq launched its “economic revolution” by abandoning its full employ-
ment policies. Almost immediately, the private sector flourished through wider access 
to available national skills. Growth picked up to the point that by 1989 there was a 
significant demand for migrant labor, especially in the construction sector. In the pe-
riod leading to the Gulf war, Iraq employed more than 4 million migrant workers. 
This boom period came to an end with the 1991 invasion of Kuwait and the subse-
quent decade U.N. sanctions and Iraq’s increasingly corrupt and authoritarian leader-
ship.15  
In short, the Ba‘thist economic model provided the government bureaucracy with 
a pragmatic, albeit doctrinaire framework for:  
1. setting prices for many goods,  
2. controlling the country’s vast oil resources,  
3. running nearly 200 state-owned enterprises, and  
4. dominating most aspects of the economy. 
The model did produce impressive rates of growth, but perhaps given the buoyant oil 
revenues at the time, the economy grew in spite of the Ba‘thist programs. On the other 
hand, given wars and sanctions, certainly not all of the economy’s demise cannot be 
attributed to a failure of the Ba‘thist model. The record is stark however: World Bank 
estimates suggest Iraq’s per capita income dropped from a height of $3,600 per year 
in the early 1980s to around $720 per year in 2002.16  
                                                          
12  Alnasrawi, op. cit. 
13  Cf. Robert Looney, “Economic Realism”, in R. J. Barry Jones, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of Inter-
national Political Economy (London: Routledge 2001), Vol I, pp. 411–419. 
14  Described in “ILO Multidisciplinary Mission to Iraq”, April 28–May 5, 2000. 
15  Sharon Otterman “The Iraqi Economy”, The Council on Foreign Relations, March 25, 2004. 
16  Ibid. 
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It’s unclear as to the extent the Ba‘thist economic principles noted above are still 
widely held by post-war Ba‘thists. Porch17 has noted that many party functionaries 
who were around at the time of Saddam’s demise were already “de-Ba‘thicized” – dis-
illusioned in the aftermath of the disastrous wars against Iran and the Allied coalition, 
followed by ten years’ of sanctions and the complete demise of the economy. 
On the other hand, many Ba‘thists in the new Interim Government (and presuma-
bly subsequent governments) left Iraq in the early 1970s, at the height of the Ba‘thist 
Model’s apparent economic success. They may still hold many of the core Ba‘thist 
economic principles, dismissing the poor economic performance in the 1980s and 
1990s as simply resulting from wars and sanctions, but not the result of any inherent 
contradictions or flaws in the Ba‘thist model itself. Even in the West, there is some 
grudging admiration for the country’s accomplishments under Saddam and the 
Ba‘thists in the 1970s:  
“While other Arab states traded their petrodollars for palaces, Iraq built roads, 
schools and factories, and sent engineers and doctors to study in the United States 
and Europe.”18
No doubt this period in Iraqi history is still is still fresh in the minds of many former 
Ba‘thists returning to help rebuild Iraq. If this is the case, some statist form of neo-
Ba‘thism − the notion that the government has a major role to play in the direction of 
the economy, both directly through the operation of state owned enterprises and indi-
rectly through the management of the overall economy may be second nature to many 
of the Ba‘thist bureaucrats in the new Interim Government – much more the case than 
many of the principles of neoliberal market reforms espoused and introduced by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).19 The quote at the beginning of the paper by 
the Iraqi Oil minister echoes this sentiment. 
As to the likely attractiveness of a neo-Ba‘thist Model vs. the free-market Neol-
beral approach to economic management in post-war Iraq: when the pollsters asked 
what promise a political party could make to win votes, nearly half of those surveyed 
said the promise of jobs created in the public sector would entice them. Only a tenth 
as many said they would be swayed by promises of market-generated jobs in the pri-
vate sector.20
2 The Post-War Economy 
Versions of either the neo-Ba‘thist or the Neoliberal economic programs face a daunt-
ing task. World Bank estimates suggest that GDP may have declined by over $500 per 
capita during 2003. This decline reflects in part the drop in oil production caused by 
the war. Widespread electricity outages also hobbled many businesses. Other factors 
                                                          
17  Doug Porch, “Germany, Japan and the ‘De-Baathification’ of Iraq”, Strategic Insight, March 7, 2003. 
18  Stephen Glain, “Saddam the Builder: He Created the First Modern Arab Economy”, Newsweek, 
March 11, 2002, p. 30. 
19  Cf. Robert Looney, “Iraq’s Economic Transition: The Neoliberal Model and its Role”, The Middle 
East Journal 57:4, Autumn 2003, pp. 568–587. 
20  Quoted in Neela Banerjee and John Cushman, “Unemployed Iraqis Say New Jobs Will Pay Off in 
Greater Security for All”, New York Times, February 8, 2004, p. 1.11. 
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hurting businesses included post-war looting, increased crime, the ongoing insur-
gency, and damage directly caused by fighting.21  
Estimates of unemployment made in the spring of 2004 ranged anywhere from 20 
to 70 percent.22 Toward the end of 2004 there was still the feeling that little had 
changed due to the breakdown in security. Of particular concern is the withdrawal of 
a number of key foreign construction and engineering companies, and the isolation of 
many foreign workers into the safe security areas in Baghdad and elsewhere.23 Even 
as early as January 2004, the deterioration in the lives of many Iraqi families 
prompted many U.S. Congressional Representatives to demand direct action:  
“The current situation for workers in Iraqis intolerable. There is massive unem-
ployment ranging from 60% to 70% of the working age population, with no sys-
tem whatsoever of unemployment compensation benefits of any type of subsis-
tence income for people to survive on until jobs become available”.24
2.1 Failure of Neoliberalism? 
To many,25 the deterioration of the post-war economy and the subsequent breakdown 
in security can be attributed to the CPA’s neoliberal approach towards reshaping the 
Iraqi economy. While the neoliberal model is sound theoretically and on solid empiri-
cal grounds,26 there were admittedly many technical flaws in the way it has been in-
troduced into Iraq. In its haste, the CPA initially pushed ahead with the reforms de-
spite the absence of creating critical supporting institutions:  
1. a sound legal system for contracts,  
2. a functioning financial sector,27 and 
3. the initial absence of a national currency.28  
Also, the neoliberal model relies on a surge in private investment to take advantage of 
the profit opportunities opened up by freeing market prices. Yet the manner in which 
the reforms were introduced created a state of uncertainty and insecurity discouraging 
that very sort of investment. Would the state enterprises be privatized? If so when and 
how? Would the Baghdad Stock Exchange be resurrected? And, if so, with what rules 
of trading and inclusion? Would the to-be legal system protect private property? And 
so on. No doubt, all of these factors contributed to the lack of enthusiasm on the part 
of investors, which without their support, and financing the neoliberal program strug-
gled to initiate economic recovery. 
                                                          
21  Sharon Otterman “The Iraqi Economy”, The Council on Foreign Relations, March 25, 2004. 
22  Anthony Shadid, “Jobless Unionize to Publicize Plight”, Washington Post, March 9, 2004. 
23  Paul Rogers, “An Iraqi Intifada?” Open Democracy, April 29, 2004. 
24  Sam Farr,Dessis Kucinich and Barbara Lee, “Help Iraqi Workers Get their Jobs Back!” U.S. House of 
Representatives, January 22, 2004. 
25  Cf. Jeff Madrick, “The Economic Plan For Iraq Seems Long on Ideology, Short on Common Sense”, 
New York Times, October 2, 2003, C.2. 
26  Robert Looney, “The Neoliberal Model’s Planned Role in Iraq’s Economic Transformation”, Middle 
East Journal 57:4, Autumn, 2003, pp. 568–587. 
27  Robert Looney, “Bean Counting in Baghdad: Debt, Reparations, Reconstruction and Resources”, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs 7:3, September 2003, pp. 60–72. 
28  Robert Looney, “A Monetary/Exchange Rate Strategy for the Reconstruction of Iraq”, Middle East 
Policy 10:3, Fall 2003, pp. 33–42. 
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In part, some of the difficulties encountered by the neo-liberal approach in Iraq 
stem from the way its perceived by Iraqis.29 Even to most Western non-economists, 
neoliberalism does not appear to form a coherent strategy aimed at job creation and 
economic recovery. Instead, the approach conveys the impression that that most im-
portant decisions concerning the allocation of resources are simply left to (capricious) 
market chance, with resulting unchecked expenditures on non essential items, increas-
ing disparity of incomes and regional imbalances. If economic recovery and growth 
occur, it is more by luck than design. Unfortunately, the absence of a significant eco-
nomic recovery or growth months after the introduction of the reforms in Iraq only 
confirms the skeptics worst suspicions:30
“In Iraq, without economic vision and realistic policies, the goodwill of spending 
efforts may end in chronic structural problems, high inflation, leading to political 
and social disturbances. As a matter of fact, since the war ended, the implemented 
economic measures and the actual expenditures have neither increased domestic 
production and productive employment nor improved the living standards of the 
majority of the people. Moreover, the main structural problems have not eased.” 
In addition, for many Iraqis the failure of the neoliberal approach to deliver economi-
cally has lent credence to the notion that neoliberalism is simply a mechanism intro-
duced by the Americans designed to shift the country’s resources out of Iraqi hands and 
into the control of foreign interests and the multinationals. The scores of web-based 
neoliberal conspiracy sites the average Iraqi finally has access to only feed this fear.31  
Neoliberal reforms have been successfully implemented, albeit under usually 
more favorable conditions, in other countries however.32 And while they have come 
under harsh criticism from a variety of sources, detractors have usually focused on the 
victims of the reforms, rather than the winners, who in most cases were in the major-
ity.33 While it’s tempting to attribute much of the post war economic malaise to the 
neoliberal model and the manner in which it has been implemented, another view 
stressing a series of shocks to the economy brought on CPA miscalculations may be a 
more accurate explanation for the country’s dire economic plight.  
2.2 Post-War Miscalculations 
The world has had lots of practice at rebuilding after conflicts and disasters and sev-
eral clear lessons have emerged. The most important is that failing to quickly ensure 
local livelihoods is the best way to create the conditions for ongoing conflict and civil 
strife.34 In Iraq, a pressing concern has been the need to alleviate chronic unemploy-
                                                          
29  Robert Looney, “The Viability of Economic Shock Therapy in Iraq”, Challenge 47:5, September–
October 2004, pp. 86–103. 
30  Sabri Zire al-Saadi, “Iraq’s Post-War Economy: A Critical Review”, Middle East Economic Survey, 
April 5, 2004. 
31  Typical is http://bloodbankers.typepad.com/recent_posts_and_pdfs/2004/06/060904the_un_se.html. 
32  Cf. Lance Taylor, “Polonius Lectures Again”, Bangladesh Development Studies 20:2–3, June/Sep-
tember 1992, pp. 25–53. 
33  Robert Looney, “Neo-liberalism”, in R. J. Barry Jones ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of International 
Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 1106–1110. 
34  Andrew Simms, “Keep it Local”, Guardian, May 14, 2003. 
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ment. Responding to this need, the United States’ Agency for International Develop-
ment’s (USAID) The National Employment Program, together with additional em-
ployment programs in the northern states has created close to 100,000 jobs out of a 
target of 155,000 new public jobs. The Iraqi ministry of finance plans to invest $125 
million in 2004 to create an additional 125,000 jobs.35 However, these programs have 
only begun to make a small dent in the country’s massive pool of unemployed. Unfor-
tunately, while the CPA did much to improve the lot of the average Iraqi, it simulta-
neously undertook actions that either directly or indirectly contributed to the nation’s 
unemployment and sense of despair. 
The de-Ba‘thification Program 
One of the more controversial decisions made by the CPA was to initiate in May 2003 
a wide-scale process of de-Ba‘thification. Of Iraq’s 25 million people, about 2.5 mil-
lion belonged to the Ba‘th Party toward the end of Saddam’s rule. After the fall of 
Saddam’s government, Ambassador Bremer and the Governing Council decreed the 
top three levels of the party membership could not be on the government payroll.  
Estimates vary, but a safe guess is that more than 120,000 people lost their jobs. 
True, some were diehard Saddam loyalists, but many others were doctors, nurses, 
university professors and other professionals who argued that they had joined the 
Ba‘th Party simply to obtain their jobs or to receive promotions or advance their ca-
reers, not out of ideology or loyalty to Saddam.36 Not only are there productive ser-
vices lost, but their reduced or lost incomes result in a slack demand for consumer 
goods, throwing many workers in those sectors out of work for lack of demand. 
The educational system was particularly hard hit by the de-Ba‘thification initia-
tive. Thousands of professors and all university deans and presidents were dismissed 
under the Bremer executive order. At the University of Basra, roughly 15 percent of 
the faculty members were fired. At the university of Baghdad, 5 percent lost their 
jobs. At the university of Tikrit 20 percent of the professors were dismissed. Univer-
sity administrators throughout Iraq are now concerned about a shortage of faculty 
members.37
Not all of the de-Ba‘thification initiatives have been undertaken by the CPA. In 
September, the interim Governing Council with Ahmed Chalabi serving in it rotating 
presidency issued an edict calling for even greater cleansing of the Ba‘th party ranks 
and allowing no exceptions. Again, estimates vary, but if implemented fully this ex-
panded purge could involve another 500,000 lost jobs. 
At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin noted: 
“Most experts agree that the de-Ba‘thification program went beyond what was 
needed to assure that the Ba‘thist leadership was not maintained.”  
He also noted that the UN envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi hand noted:  
                                                          
35  Bill Jamison, “Dawn of Hope for Iraqi Economy”, Scotland on Sunday, May 30, 2004. 
36  Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Generals Criticize Ban on Employing Es-Baathists”, International Herald Tribune, 
April 21, 2004. 
37  Daniel del Castillo, “In Iraq, Daunting Tasks for Higher Education”, The Chronicle of Higher Educa-
tion 50:3, September 12, 2003, A.37.  
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“It is difficult to understand that thousands upon thousands of professionals who 
are solely needed have been dismissed within the de-Ba‘thification process”.38
Prime Minister Iyad Allawi while a member of Iraq’s Governing Council argued that 
the U.S. policy of de-Ba‘thification is hampering restoration of political and economic 
life in the country. He feels that the policy is creating a culture of “false accusations” 
and “cronyism”.  
“Unfortunately, the current, indiscriminant policy of ‘debathification’ – the whole-
sale purging of Iraqis who joined the Ba‘th Party to get a job – does not contrib-
ute to economic reconstruction, political stability or the cause of justice and na-
tional reconciliation.”  
“Such a process is patently vulnerable to corruption by vested interests and can 
create a legal culture of false accusations, corruption and cronyism, undermining 
justice as well as free-market competition.”39  
Belatedly, in April of 2004 after much of the damage was one, Ambassador Bremer 
reversed the much criticized de-Ba‘thification policy and noted that many laid-off 
Ba‘thist teachers would be eligible to regain their jobs through a newly streamlined 
appeals process.40
Disbanding the Army and Security Forces 
Public employment also fell after the war, largely as a result of the CPA’s controver-
sial decision in Late May to disband the army. When the war ended, the army con-
sisted of about 500,000 or about 7 percent of the labor force. The coalition would later 
pay stipends to former soldiers, but the decision to put them back on the streets with-
out jobs has been blamed for the increase in insurgency.41  
Numerous Iraqi accounts42 document the disruption caused by both the de-Ba‘thi-
fication program and the disbanding of the army and security forces:  
“As a result the local economy suffered as unemployment jumped and former 
residents returning from Baghdad, after losing government and military jobs, 
pushed rents and property prices higher.”43
“They have wounded pride to restore. Entire tribes feel embarrassed that they 
supported the invasion only to be left out in the cold by the Coalition’s myopic 
vision of how Iraq should be run. And it is men like them that have become easy 
prey for foreign fighters, Saddam loyalists, criminal gangs and other groups that 
have no interest in seeing Iraq become a success story.”44
                                                          
38  Quoted in Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Generals Criticize Ban on Employing Ex-Baathists”, International Her-
ald Tribune, April 21, 2004. 
39  Quoted in “De-Baathification Hampering US Reconstruction”, Jordan Times, December 29, 2003. 
40  Nicholas Riccardi, “Iraqi Teachers Learn Hard Political Lesson: Hussein’s Victims and Baath Party 
Members Compete for Lucrative and Limited Positions”, Los Angeles Times, May 14, 2004, A.10. 
41  Christopher Foote, William Block, Keith Crane, and Simon Gray, “Economic Policy as Prospects in 
Iraq”, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 04-1, May 4, 2004, p. 11. 
42  See for example, Mustafa Alrawi, “Will the Coalition Ever Want to Understand Iraqis?” Iraq Today, 
November 3, 2003. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid. 
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Prime Minister Iyad Allawi has also made it clear45 that Iraq needs the expertise of many 
who worked under Saddam if it is to rebuild security and intelligence services to the point 
that they can quell Islamist militants and sectarian militias once the American troops leave 
the country. Until then, the reduced level of security stemming from this lost expertise is 
taking a tremendous toll on employment, economic activity, and civilian life. 
Delays in Reconstruction 
As he travels across Iraq, Retired U.S. Admiral David Nash, the official in charge of 
reconstructing the war-shattered country is greeted with a common complaint:  
“If Saddam Hussein could rebuild the country in three months after the Persian 
Gulf war, why is it taking the Americans so long?”  
“Saddam Hussein used methods we don’t subscribe to”  
he tells the Iraqis46. Unfortunately, there is more to it than that. Seven months after 
Congress approved the largest foreign aid package in history to rebuild Iraq, less than 
5 percent of the $18.4 billion had been spent.47  
In January 2004, the CPA indicated it planed on spending nearly $8 billion 
through March of 2004. Much of the short-fall was attributed to what Representative 
Jim Kolbe termed “bureaucratic infighting” and a “loss of central command and con-
trol”.48 By late May the pace of expenditure appeared to be picking up, under Con-
gressional pressure.49 However by September50 the expenditure situation had improved 
only very lightly and by then the damage to Iraqi good will caused by unnecessary 
delays was more than apparent and perhaps beyond repair.  
Clearly the insurgency and the overall deterioration in security have added further 
delays to the reconstruction efforts. As a result, of the dozens of U.S. corporations that 
have government contracts to help rebuild the country, relatively few have invested their 
own capital. In addition, the volatile security situation has kept many potential investors 
away, and even as the U.S.-led coalition government has called on businesses to come 
to Iraq, the State Department has warned Americans to stay out of the country.51
The net effect of the reconstruction delays is only to apparent in the stark statis-
tics compiled by the UN World Food Program (WFP). According to the WFP, as late 
as September 2004 one in four Iraqis was still highly dependent on food rations and 
that 2.6 million were so impoverished that they sold part of their share to buy other 
vital necessities. The WFP warned that another 3.6 million Iraqis or about 14 percent 
of the country’s estimated 26 million population would become food insecure if the 
rationing system were discontinued52.  
                                                          
45  Alastair Macdonald and Lin Noueihed, “Allawi Slams US Over Iraq Army”, Swiss Politics.Org, 
June 5, 2004. 
46  Geoffrey York, “U.S. Repairs in Iraq May Come to Late”, Globe and Mail, May 25, 2004. 
47  Jonathan Weisman and Ariana Cha, “Rebuilding Aid Unspent, Tapped to Pay Expenses”, Washington 
Post, April 30, 2004, A1. 
48  Weisman and Cha, op. cit. 
49  Robert O’Harrow, “U.S. Finally Spending Iraq Construction Funds”, Washington Post, May 25, 2004, A11. 
50  Paul Richer, “Much of U.S. Aid Isn’t Directly Helping Iraqis”, Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2004. 
51  Ariana Eunjung Cha and Jackie Spinner, “U.S. Companies Put Little Capital into Iraq”, Washington 
Post, May 15, 2004, A.17. 
52  “One In Four Iraqis Still Dependent on Food Handouts”, Agence France Presse, September 29, 2004. 
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Over-Reliance on Big Projects/Foreign Contractors 
For the most part, the CPA tried to rebuild the economy by relying largely on specialist 
contractors who had specific skills and international experience. This may have made 
a certain amount of sense in terms of expediency and efficiency, but overlooked the 
simple fact that the reconstruction projects need to be viewed in a broader, multiple goal 
context. Not only should they reconstruct Iraq in the fiscal sense, but they should have 
the potential to immediately address many of the country’s social problems.  
In principle Iraqi companies were to be secondary beneficiaries of the $18.6 bil-
lion in aid allocated for reconstruction by the U.S. Seventeen primary contractors 
were to be chosen and, in turn, sub-contracting out to other firms. Iraqi firms were to be 
given priority in the sub-contracting bidding, although firms from a list of sixty-nine 
coalition countries could also bid. As it turned out, Iraqi companies were at a distinct 
disadvantage in competing with foreign firms because they did not have the capital, nor 
could they obtain the necessary financing from the country’s primitive banking system.53
As contracted therefore, reconstruction projects are simply not getting enough 
money into the hands of entrepreneurial Iraqis and large segments of the Iraqi work-
force. As noted above, one theory gaining wider acceptance is that with the economy 
struggling, and millions of Iraqis with little to do, people are becoming ever more 
tempted to join the resistance.54 By May 2004 fewer than 25,000 Iraqis were working 
on projects funded by the U.S.  
“... tempering expectations that more than $18 billion in American spending would 
jump-start Iraq’s economy and trigger a surge in goodwill towards the United States”.55
Delays in Restoring the Financial System 
As noted above, most Iraqi companies are not able to take advantage of reconstruction 
jobs because of lack of credit. Whether these midsize businesses succeed or fail with 
their job creating expansions is critical for stability. Again, delays in restoring the 
country’s banking and financial system are severely limiting the economy’s recovery. 
At the start of the war, Iraq’s two state owned banks, Rasheed and Rafidain, con-
trolled over 85 percent of banking assets. They were at best marginally capitalized 
and had loan portfolios with a high concentration of non-performing loans. Before 
March 2003, the banks clearly lacked modern comprehensive accounting standards 
and systems.56 They had little or no expertise in lending to the corporate sector. 
The US Treasury has worked with the state banks enabling them to provide better 
domestic services such and taking deposits, clearing checks and making loans to sup-
port business activity. There are some limited signs of success. For the Quarter ending 
November 30, 2003. Iraq’s two large state-owned commercial banks Rafidain and 
Rasheed, extended loans totaling about $6 million primarily to small and medium en-
                                                          
53  Ali B. Al-Shouk, “CPA Prepares Iraqi Firms for Reconstruction Subcontracts”, Iraq Today, Decem-
ber 29, 2003. 
54  Hassah Fattah, “Put Iraq to Work”, The New Republic, June 6, 2004. 
55  Matt Kelly, “Fewer than 25,000 Iraqis Working on Reconstruction Funded by U.S.” Associated Press, 
May 18, 2004. 
56  John B. Taylor, “Financial Reconstruction in Iraq”, Testimony, Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs Committee: Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance (February 11, 2004). 
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terprises.57 Again, a sum far short of making any sort of meaningful contribution to the 
country’s economic recovery. It will take even longer for the country’s twenty or so 
small private banks to make any significant contribution to private sector investment. 
Other sources of finance have not developed. Although now permitted, foreign 
banks have not ventured into Iraq. After much fanfare in late 2003 of a January 2004 
opening, the Baghdad Stock Exchange did not begin operations until June58.  
Belatedly, to address the private sector’s dire credit needs CPA has begun (May 
2004) accepting applications for a new program designed to provide loans of 
$500,000 to $5, million for midsize companies. However as of early June 2004 the 
program was still not formally approved59. Under other programs the coalition has dis-
tributed about $7.5 million in “microfinance” credits, typically loans averaging 
$2,500 for small businesses such as bakeries and grocery stores. An additional $17.5 
million is in the pipeline for that effort60. Again, these amounts are dwarfed by the 
country’s needs.  
3 Vicious Circles 
Rather than the neoliberal policies initiated by the CPA, most of the economy’s post 
war failure is no doubt due to a series of administrative blunders. These have created 
shocks to the economy so severe that that price mechanisms are unable to equilibrate 
at a satisfactory level of output and employment. 
Specifically the five major CPA miscalculations noted above have combined to 
produce a vicious cycle in Iraq (Figure 1) to the extent that the price system is not 
able to counteract. The job losses, both actual and potential created by these miscalcu-
lations have resulted in wide spread disillusionment with the CPA. Growing despair, 
growing resistance and diminished confidence in the future have lead to increased 
violence and insurgency. In this situation, Patrick Clawson has noted after returning 
from a recent fact-finding mission to Iraq: 
“It is hard to overstate the importance of the economic issue; as one Iraqi politi-
cian put it, ‘the belly is more important than the tongue’, meaning people care 
more about meeting basic needs than about their new-found freedom of speech.”61
The security situation and the economy are now interlinked. Unless each improves 
dramatically, the country is likely to be trapped in a longer term vicious circle (Figure 2), 
whereby poor economic performance leads to increased instability, in turn making the 
continuation of neoliberal reforms extremely difficult. But these reforms are neces-
sary if the economy is to become integrated into the world economy and achieve in-
ternational standards of efficiency. Lower growth rates stemming from the lack of re-
forms would then no doubt eventually initiate more unrest and further deterioration of 
the economy.  
                                                          
57  Ibid. 
58  Deborah Haynes, “Iraq Stock Exchange Poised to Rally in ‘Japan’ of the Middle East”, Agence 
France Presse, July 16, 2004. 
59  David Lynch, “Cash Crunch Curbs Rebuilding in Iraq”, USA Today, June 1, 2004. 
60  Ibid. 
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Clearly a number of pressing issues are before the new Interim Government: 
1. Impact of security situation and other investor concerns on private investment – 
what factors will it take for investors to gain confidence in the future? 
2. Links between deteriorating economic conditions and reform process – how much 
pressure will this place on authorities to slow-down or reverse reforms? 
3. Manner in which budget deficits financed? Will there be adequate aid, or will the 
government be forced to sell bonds? Will the markets be able to absorb this debt 
without crowding out private investment? 
4. Can the country overcome the likely initial drop in private savings with added 
foreign funds? 
5. The extent to which low initial savings rates limit financial development 
The answers to all of these are important in policy planning and budgeting over the next 
several years. However, in the bigger scheme of things, the new Iraqi government starts 
at a crossroads. Its leaders can either choose to press ahead with the neoliberal reforms 
or to revert to some sort of Ba‘thist-type state controlled system, emphasizing jobs 
through perhaps creating massive public works programs, increased staffing at the state 
enterprises and an expanded government bureaucracy. No doubt there will be strong ad-
vocates for this latter nationalistic approach from large constituencies – as noted above 
it worked in the 1970s and was a source of pride for the Iraqis. The neo-Ba‘thist eco-
nomic option is expedient and would, in contrast to the neoliberal model, face little do-
mestic opposition. If oil prices remain high and the country can prevent sabotage to the 
oilfields, this would be an attractive as well as feasible option.  
One needs only a casual look around the Middle East, however, to quickly realize 
that neo-Ba‘thism or some statist variant will not put the country on a path to high 
sustained growth and broad based prosperity. The history of the region is awash with 
stories of failed state controlled economies. If Iraq does decide (and is sanctioned to 
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by the U.S.62, major aid providers, and international institutions like the IMF/World 
Bank) to revert down the neo-Ba‘thist economic path to escape its vicious cycle, the 
great risk is in creating forces and interest groups that will later oppose the necessary 
eventual transition to a normal economy. 
4 Creation of a Virtuous Circle 
“What is happening here is just a phase and the bad news is being exaggerated. 
But the biggest problem is security … Once the security situation is improved, as 
we hope it will under the new government, the economy will take off.”63
Ismael Al Bahrani, Managing Director, Bahrani Group 
It appears that the interim government subscribes to this view, perhaps hoping that 
with a number of new construction projects coming online, unemployment will come 
under control and bring about a lessening of insurgency. With an improvement in se-
curity, increases in aid flows should follow, thus facilitating more reconstruction ex-
penditures and job creation. If the existing CPA reforms serve a starting point for fur-
ther market-based and governance reforms, it is possible to visualize a virtuous circle 
of growth and reform gaining traction, (Figure 3) just it did in many of the successful 
transition economies in Eastern Europe.64
Figure 2 
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62  Cf. Yochi J. Dreazen and Christopher Cooper, “ Behind the Scenes, U.S. Tightens Grip on Iraq’s Fu-
ture”, Wall Street Journal, May 13, 2004, A.1. 
63  Quoted in Gareth Smyth, “Lack of Direction in Iraq Stunts Business Growth”, Financial Times, July 9, 2004. 
64  Cf. Oleh Havrylyshyn and Thomas Wolf, “Determinants of Growth in Transition Countries”, Finance 
& Development, June 1999, pp. 12–15. 
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None of this will occur automatically. Progress will require the Iraqi government to 
shift from an expenditures/reconstruction mindset to a reform/development/growth 
orientation. Clearly, some reforms will be more effective than others in lifting the 
country to a path of high sustained growth. Analysis suggests that, for oil based 
economies like Iraq, increased efforts in four economic/governance areas appear 
critical:65  
1. rule of law,  
2. voice and accountability,  
3. banking and finance, and finally  
4. foreign investment. 
Interestingly, the first two are the most important and fall in the area of governance, 
with the economic variables assuming a lesser, but still important role in advancing 
countries along the reform path to a higher level of transition66.  
Of course sustaining reforms is easier said than done. Many transition countries 
have experienced stalled reforms after several years of productive liberalization and 
institution building. As with the transition economies, the reform process in Iraq can 
take the country in one of two directions. Through their past reform efforts, several 
Eastern European/Baltic countries, such as Hungary and Czech Republic, are close to 
being predominantly market economies. They have experienced healthy a sustained 
economic revival and have met or are close to meeting the conditions for membership 
in the European Union (EU). In contrast, other transition economies, for example, 
Moldova, which started their reform process at the same time, have implemented re-
forms to the extent they no longer have socialist economies, but are still struggling to 
develop their private sector, complete the liberalization of prices, establish market in-
stitutions, rationalize government activity, and impose an effective rule of law67 (see 
Figure 3).  
Why has one group of countries succeeded while the other failed? Recent litera-
ture on reforms in transition countries stresses the problem of rent seeking and vested 
interests, groups who benefit financially from the exiting state of affairs and have a 
financial incentive to block further reform. One can already see these groups forming 
in Iraq, especially workers in the state enterprises, who are paid excessively high sala-
ries, with no real incentive to work. Many others who are receiving subsidized en-
ergy, food, etc. are making good profits by selling these products in the black markets 
of neighboring countries. No doubt there are many other instances of individuals or 
groups benefiting from the current incomplete state of Iraqi reform efforts. The more 
numerous and entrenched these groups and individuals become, the greater the obsta-
cles to advancing reforms in Iraq.  
                                                          
65  Based on a regression analysis of the country discriminant score and its level of reform effort. Cf. 
Robert Looney, “The Broader Middle East Initiative: Requirements for Success in the Gulf”, Working 
Paper, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, August 2004. 
66  Ibid. 
67  Olen Havrylyshyn and John Odling-Smee, “Political Economy of Stalled Reforms”, Finance & De-
velopment 37:3, September 2000. 
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To offset these groups, Iraqi reformers will have to create their own groups of win-
ners, individuals and groups that can see the success of their efforts as well as the link 
between the reforms and their success. In Eastern Europe, these groups have often 
been workers and entrepreneurs associated with new small- and medium-sized busi-
nesses. It is in this sector that most of the new jobs will have to be created in Iraq. For 
this reason, a top economic priority should be the health and vitality of the country’s 
financial system. The CPA reforms have laid the foundation for the system, but much 
work remains. 
Although the CPA reforms do no appear to be an impediment to the economy’s 
recovery, by themselves they are unlikely to perform miracles. Sooner or later the 
Iraqis will have to implement a development strategy focused on diversifying the 
economy away from the oil sector. At that time, many of the reforms in place today 
will have to be modified so that they are consistent with the encouragement of a 
broad-based industrial structure and provide for a diversified source of revenues for 
the government. While the current no-tariff policy is useful in allowing a clearer iden-
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tification of the country’s comparative advantage outside the energy sector, temporary 
tariffs will have to be enacted to facilitate infant industry development. Also, the tax 
system will have to be revamped so that the authorities are better able to shift re-
sources in desired directions and, in the absence of an oil fund, offset oil price fluctua-
tions.  
These are largely technical issues and should be easy for the country’s skilled 
technocrats to implement. Most likely, the greatest challenge facing Iraq’s transition 
to a stable, pluralistic, free market democracy will be simply finding the will to initi-
ate and sustaining the reform process. The greatest obstacle may well be overcoming 
the legacy of Saddam Hussein: 
“Sadly, it seems that many Iraqis do not understand how capitalism works, and 
why a market economy can make the poor people much better off than they ever 
were when Saddam controlled the oil wealth and dolled out perks to the Iraqis 
like a stern parent rewards small children for being seen and not heard.”68  
                                                          
68  Ronald D. Rotunda, “Iraq, Oil, and Democracy”, Cato Institute, April 23, 2004, http://www.cato.org/ 
dailys/04-23-04.html. 
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